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Abstract
This paper examines different reasons the websites may
vary in their availability by location. Prior works on
availability mostly focus on censorship by nation states.
We look at three forms of server-side blocking: blocking
visitors from the EU to avoid GDPR compliance, block-
ing based upon the visitor’s country, and blocking due to
security concerns. We argue that these and other forms
of blocking warrant more research.
1 Introduction
We often conceptualize the Internet as one global and
shared infrastructure comprehensively connecting peo-
ple from every part of the world. In practice, however,
different users experience different Internets. The differ-
ences in experience can arise for various reasons, such
as ISPs creating restricted “walled gardens” for their
customers, governments censoring access to resources,
copyright regulations restricting access to protected con-
tent, and web servers blocking unwanted access. These
partionings of the Internet in terms of the way content
is served to different end users reflect instances of the
“balkanization”1 of the Internet into a “splinternet”.
Currently, a large body of research exists on under-
standing access restrictions by authoritarian states for
censorship (e.g., [50, 14, 32, 17, 38, 41, 13, 5, 44, 46,
30, 37, 4, 18, 3, 11, 33, 19]). Other forms of access
restriction, often controlled by algorithms running on a
website’s servers or CDNs, have received much less em-
pirical exploration.
Herein, we explore forms of that blocking that
do not fit into the quintessential conceptualization of
censorship—we leave it to the reader to decide which
count as censorship. After enumerating various types
of blocking (Section 2), we present measurements for
1For a critical discussion of the term see Maurer [34].
three such forms of blocking. We show that the num-
ber of pages unavailable from three locations in the EU
increased after the EU’s General Data Protection Reg-
ulation (GDPR) went into effect (Section 3). We also
look for, and find, other blockpages explicitly listing ge-
ography as the reason for blocking (Section 4). Finally,
we look for blockpages and practices suggesting security
concerns (Section 5).
While many of these issues have been discussed, and
in some cases measured, in isolation, we believe this
work to be the first to consider the range the blocking
in a systematic manner. We also discuss the difficulties
of seperating out each form from the others, which is
further complicated by the possiblity of a single block
corresponding to more than one form. Our contributions
are, admittedly preliminary: our list of blocking types
is incomplete and tilted toward location-based blocking;
our measurement studies are small-scale. Nevertheless,
we believe there to be value in laying out this space
of research opportunities while highlighting the risks of
claiming to measure only a single phenomenon given the
lack of isolation between the types of blocking we con-
sider.
Prior Work. We know of no prior works laying out
the space of forms of blocking, the goal of this work.
However, there are numerous papers looking at various
forms of blocking in isolation. Thus, rather than have a
dedicated prior work section, we will cover these works
where we discuss the form of blocking they cover, mostly
in the next section.
2 Types of Blocking
Suppose you run a test to find that a website will load
in the US but not in China. If the website is politically
sensitive, it is not unreasonable to suspect censorship, but
numerous other possibilities exist.
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Perhaps the first thing to check is nature of the block:
was it just a transient network failure? did DNS fail? is
there a CAPTCHA? a blockpage providing an explana-
tion? a blockpage without an explanation? or an error
message? For example, while CAPTCHAs can be an-
noying, they seem like an unlikely choice for censor-
ship since they, when working as designed, merely slow
down the accessing of data. Each of the others seem like
stronger indications of censorship, including, to a lesser
extent, even blockpages claiming the cause to be some-
thing else, since censors may mislead.
Another factor to check is what the blocking is tar-
geting. The blocking could be targeting something other
location, such as the OS or browser used, automated bots
loading pages, or being logged out of a service. For ex-
ample, some websites block Tor [29, 42]. Keeping these
factors and other factors consistent across the two loca-
tions can help rule them out, leading to location-based
blocking becoming the most likely explanation.
Questions will still remain about what sort of location
is targeted by the block. The targeted location might be
geographic, such as a campus, sub-national region, coun-
try, or super-national region. Alternatively, the targeted
location might be defined in terms of network topology:
an IP address, an IP address range, a network, or an AS.
One can also ask whether the blocking is whitelisting or
blacklisting. In whitelisting, a website aims to serve its
content to only visitors within its region. In blacklisting,
a website aims to exclude certain regions. Determining
the target of the block and its mode of operation can be
tricky. For example, a large enough blacklist will look
like a whitelist, and blocking enough IP addresses indi-
vidually will eventually block a whole range or even a
whole country.
Furthermore, given that geographic blocks are likely
implemented by blocking IP address ranges assigned to
the targeted country, targeting can be considered at mul-
tiple levels from specification to implementation. Nev-
ertheless, in Section 4, we are able to find country-based
blocking with high confidence by finding blockpages that
confess to it. Censorship could target any of these no-
tions of location, but the blacklisting of a whole country
(the government’s own country) is the most characteristic
of censorship.
Another factor is where in the network the blocking is
happening. The paragon of censorship is a government-
operated middlebox at the national border. However,
other possibilities exist. The ISP of the client might be
doing the blocking (e.g., [17]), or the ISP of the server
hosting the tested website, or the website itself. A com-
bination of examining how the block operates and addi-
tional measurements can sometimes determine which of
these possibilities it is [17, 48, 4, 1].
However, even determining where in the network
the blocking is happening does not definitively reveal
whether censorship is in action. Suppose, you find that
the blocking is done by the ISP of your client in China.
This could be because the government of China ordered
the block or because the ISP is performing some sort
of traffic filtering, in violation of net neutrality, to raise
more revenue or cut costs.
Alternatively, suppose you find that the website’s
server is doing the blocking. At first, this might seem
to be a clear indication that the block is for some rea-
son other than censorship, such as concerns over abuse.
However, this could still be an instance of China cen-
soring the website, just in the more roundabout man-
ner of pressuring the website into blocking visitors from
China. Indeed, Western companies have altered their
websites for Chinese visitors to comply with China’s de-
mands [10]. Alternately, it could be the server’s country
doing the censorship by ordering the blocking of visitors
from China as part of economic sanctions [6, 23].
In fact, government orders are behind many sorts of
server-side blocking that might or might not strike the
reader as censorship. A recent example is the passage of
SESTA, a US law holding websites liable for some third-
party content facilitating prostitution, which has lead to
a website geo-blocking the US [8]. An example we will
explore is websites blocking the EU to avoid GDPR com-
pliance (Section 3). Where to draw the line as to which
count as censorship is unclear to us, but server-side cen-
sorship of one form or another is possible.
With this mind, it is clear that censorship is not merely
an issue of where the blocking is happening or who is
doing it, but rather one of why the blocking is happen-
ing, that is, upon whose orders. In some cases, the roles
might be switched from what is expected. For exam-
ple, arguably, copyright is a form of censorship in which
the copyright holder gets a government to enforce its
claim [43, 40, 2] In theory, a website could pay a gov-
ernment to implement a regional block to reduce abuse
or increase its market share, leading to an odd form of
hybrid government–corporate censorship.
Before concluding that censorship has happened, other
possible motivations behind the block should be consid-
ered. Table 1 provides a partial list of different forms of
blocking. One possibility is security concerns, such as
fraud and abuse, which is associated with certain coun-
tries [9, 1]. We look at such blocking in Section 5. An-
other possibility is concerns over the costs of serving
traffic to some countries, which can be seen as a wasted
expense for companies not targeting that market. This
issue can be exacerbated by the serving of traffic to the
developing world sometimes being more expensive than
serving it to the developed world [1].
Also with profits in mind, companies may engage in
blocking to increase revenue, by charging extra fees to
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Table 1: Examples of Motivations behind Location-based Blocking. Those marked with ∗ denote location in the
network topology instead of geo-location. ∗∗ denotes cases where we use a non-location-based block due to not
finding a location-based one.
Server (including CDNs) Middlebox (ISPs, governments)
Political censorship Bowing to China’s demands [10] Great Firewall of China (lots)
Economic sanctions US websites blocking Cuba [6] & Iran [23]
Third-party liability Blocking US due to SESTA [8]
Copyright YouTube blocking in Germany [43, 40] ISPs blocking the Pirate Bay [2]
Other compliance GDPR (§3)
Security Blocking countries assoc. w. fraud [9, 1] (§5)
Hosting costs CDN fees [1]
Revenue Price discrimination [35, 36, 45, 24] Net-neutrality [28]∗
Unintentional Slash-dotting [47]∗∗ Overloaded rural links [27, 49]
access some regions or by blocking competitors, viola-
tions of net neutrality [28]. While not blocking, some
websites have engaged in price discrimination, which
can also negatively affect some visitors based upon their
location [35, 36, 45, 24].
Finally, blocks can be unintentional, for example,
from misconfiguration or failures caused by lacking
enough bandwidth [47, 27, 49].
Above, we mentioned numerous forms of blocking,
but they are not independent of one another. For exam-
ple, some serve as implementation approaches for oth-
ers. Measurement studies must take care not to conflate
forms of blocking. The obvious way of doing so is to
just ignore the differences. Less obvious is conflation by
attempting identify a form using proxies for it without
making assumptions explicit, such as assuming that no
server-side blocking is censorship. Developing methods
for distinguishing between blocking types could also aid
the blocked users, who currently struggle to understand
what is happening and why [21]
3 GDPR-Motivated Geo-blocking
The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
contains a wide range of provisions designed to protect
the privacy of people who use online services and to give
them more control over their data [20]. Complying with
some of the provisions may require a major shift in how
some websites store and process data about their visi-
tors. (See Lomas [31] for an overview.) For example,
in general, visitors have the right to access, correct, and
delete data about themselves. Implementing these abili-
ties can create an implementational headache given sys-
tems engineered to use and store data indiscriminately.
Furthermore, getting it correct is high stakes, with fines
of e 20M or 4% of a company’s global annual revenue.
Given the uncertainty and stakes, some websites have de-
cided to exit the European market, at least for the time
being [25, 26]. To partly quantify this effect, we analyze
the differences in availability of a convenience sample of
websites before and after GDPR went into effect.
From our prior work [1], we re-used a data set show-
ing the availability of 7081 websites, which we collected
to study a different facet of server-side blocking. These
websites form the union of various Alexa top 500 lists:
the global list, the lists for ten countries, and the lists for
nine categories of websites. For each URL, we measured
it from three locations in the EU via a VPN: London,
United Kingdom; Sofia, Bulgaria; and Frankfurt, Ger-
many. From each location, we use one of the measure-
ments of the URLs before GDPR came into effect. The
crawler used in these measurements attempted DNS res-
olution for each URL, logging any errors. For those that
resolved, it used Python’s Requests package to request
the webpage, logging errors, status codes, and content.
See our prior work for details [1].
After GDPR came into effect, we re-used our measure-
ment infrastructure of to take a second measurement of
each URL. We took the data and analyzed it for changes
in website availability.
Using error logs and status codes, we found 74 web-
sites that, for all three European locations, sent an HTTP
status code of 200 OK when accessed before May 25 and
non-200 status after May 25, 2018. Out of the 74 web-
sites, 40 responded with a 403 Forbidden status code
and a block page explicitly mentioning “Blocked due to
GDPR” (Table 2). Seven websites used the HTTP sta-
tus code 451 Unavailable For Legal Reasons (Table 3),
the code named for a novel on censorship [7]. All of
47 of these websites with explicit blockpages are local
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Table 2: Websites explicitly mentioning GDPR as mo-
tativation for blocking. The Before column shows the
status for all the vantage points. DE represents DNS Er-
ror.
Before After
URL/Country US BGR GBR DEU
bismarcktribune.com 200 200 DE 403 403
collegian.psu.edu 200 200 403 403 403
dailynebraskan.com 200 200 DE 403 403
dailyprogress.com 200 200 403 403 403
fredericknewspost.com 200 200 403 403 403
fredericksburg.com 200 200 403 DE 403
globegazette.com 200 200 403 403 403
greensboro.com 200 200 403 403 403
gwinnettdailypost.com 200 200 403 403 403
havasunews.com 200 200 403 403 403
heraldtimesonline.com 200 200 403 403 403
host.madison.com/wsj 200 200 403 403 403
journalnow.com 200 200 403 403 403
journalstar.com 200 200 403 403 403
journaltimes.com 200 200 DE 403 403
lacrossetribune.com 200 200 403 403 403
lancasteronline.com 200 200 403 403 403
napavalleyregister.com 200 200 DE 403 403
nwitimes.com 200 200 DE 403 403
omaha.com 200 200 403 403 403
pantagraph.com 200 200 403 403 403
pilotonline.com 200 200 403 403 403
postandcourier.com 200 200 403 403 403
postbulletin.com 200 200 403 403 403
pressofatlanticcity.com 200 200 DE 403 403
qctimes.com 200 200 403 403 403
rapidcityjournal.com 200 200 403 403 403
richmond.com 200 200 403 403 403
roanoke.com 200 200 403 403 403
santafenewmexican.com 200 200 403 403 403
southbendtribune.com 200 200 403 403 403
stltoday.com 200 200 403 403 403
theadvocate.com 200 200 403 403 403
trib.com 200 200 403 403 403
tucson.com 200 200 403 403 403
wacotrib.com 200 200 403 403 403
wcfcourier.com 200 200 DE 403 403
wvgazettemail.com 200 200 403 403 403
yakimaherald.com 200 200 403 403 403
Table 3: Websites mentioning “Blocked for legal rea-
sons”. The Before column shows the status for all the
vantage points. DE represents DNS Error.
Before After
URL/Country US BGR GBR DEU
ctpost.com 200 200 451 451 451
greenwichtime.com 200 200 451 451 451
lmtonline.com 200 200 DE 451 451
newstimes.com 200 200 451 451 451
nhregister.com 200 200 451 451 451
seattlepi.com 200 200 451 451 451
stamfordadvocate.com 200 200 451 451 451
news websites, incidentally, a plausible target of cen-
sorship as well. One website, brownells.com, asks
users to visit their EU website, www.brownells.eu.
The remaining 27 websites do not provide any explicit
blockpages and use rather vague status codes and con-
nection errors. For example, the online gaming web-
site addictinggames.com returns an empty page with a
404 Page Not Found status code, the math tutoring web-
site webmath.com refuses the TCP connection, and the
reality website 99acres.com responded with a 412 Pre-
condition Failed error code.
Providing context to our findings, looking online, we
found services aiming to make it easy to block all EU
visitors [39, 12].
4 Country-based Blocking
Cloudflare, a CDN, is an interesting subject of study,
not only because it hosts many websites, but because it
provides more information than many explaining why it
blocks, on the behalf of the website owner, certain re-
quests. In this section and the next, we analyze Cloud-
flare’s block notices looking for country-based and then
security-motivated blocking. We emphasize that we se-
lected Cloudflare not because we believe it to engage in
such blocks any more than any other host, nor because
we believe it should be singled out for criticism. Rather,
we selected Cloudflare since prior work has found it
blocking Tor based on abuse [29] and because of the in-
formation that Cloudflare provides about blocks, a com-
mendable feature.
We start by finding sites hosted by Cloudflare. We re-
solved the top 1M Alexa domains, and identified those
hosted by Cloudflare by performing whois lookups on
the resolved IP addresses and keeping those contain-
ing “Cloudflare” in the AS name. We identified 85,421
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Figure 1: SonicWall Blockpage Showing the Motivation
to be GDPR avoidance.
Cloudflare-hosted URLs in this fashion.
Next, for each of these Cloudflare-hosted URLs, we
retrieved the website from five vantage points: Pakistan
(home network), Scotland (VPN), South Africa (cloud),
Ukraine (VPN), and US (institutional network). The
US crawler experienced failure, limiting its collection
77,935 URLs.
We then classified the responses. By examining
the blockpages themselves and Cloudflare’s documen-
tation [22, 15], we determined that a response with an
HTTP status code of 403 and a body that referenced
Cloudflare’s own error code 1009 indicates blocking by
country. Table 4 shows a breakdown of the responses by
both this code and others, some of which will be relevant
to the next section.
We found 524 websites using country-based blocking
by Cloudflare under error code 1009. We also found
one website using country-based blocking by a differ-
ent service provider, Dell’s SonicWall, which the website
motorcar.com used in addition to Cloudflare. The error
message for SonicWall’s 403 blockpage says “Sorry this
content is not available in your country due to GDPR”,
shown in Figure 1, proving to be instance of both GDPR
and country-based blocking.
Interestingly, 32 websites were country blocked in the
US, with 21 giving a Cloudflare 1009 error. We manually
checked all 32 and found five that would load, including
one that was give a 1009 error to the crawler. A differ-
ent website with a 1009 error was aquapro.biz. It was
blocking countries and manually unavailable in the US,
but consistently misidentified our country in an incon-
sistent manner, seemingly to assign us other countries at
random. The remaining 1009 errors explicitly blocked
the US. (For an example, see Figure 2.)
While the rate of country blocks varied from country
to country, this comparison is complicated by the fact
that different countries had different success rates at get-
ting any response from the server. For example, Pak-
istan had an abnormally high rate of DNS errors, possi-
Figure 2: Cloudflare Blockpage with a 1009 Error Code
bly due to network failures or censorship. This differ-
ence might hide a much higher rate of blocks in Pakistan
than in Scotland. Alternatively, Scotland using a VPN
and Pakistan using a home network might hide the differ-
ence. However, Scotland and Ukraine can be compared
on a fairly even basis for both of these factors. For them,
we see a large difference with Ukraine receiving more
blocks.
5 Security-motivated Blocking
Using the same data set, we also looked for security-
motivated blocking. While we recognize that some
country-based blocks may have security as its motiva-
tion, we exclude those that we found to explicitly claim-
ing to be country-based blocks to focus on those not yet
discussed. We look at other types of blocking that could
have been motivated by security concerns, while admit-
ting that we cannot be sure of the real motivations behind
a block.
Again, Cloudflare’s documentation helped us know
where to look [22, 15]. The most indicative error code of
security concerns is 1010, described as “bad browser”,
which happens when “The source of the request was
not legitimate or the request itself was malicious” [22].
Cloudflare also uses error code 1012 to deny access
“based on malicious activity detected from your com-
puter or your network (ip address)” [16]. We also in-
cluded error codes indicating an IP block, although those
could be used for non-security reasons.
Finally, we looked at restrictions short of outright
blocking. Namely, Cloudflare will sometimes make
users solve a CAPTCHA before showing them the page.
Cloudflare will also use a “browser challenge” on visi-
tors it suspects of being a bot, which we looked for (see
Figure 3).
Table 4 shows how common each of these, and other,
outcomes are. As with country-based blocking, compar-
ing across countries is confounded. Looking again at
the well matched pair of Scotland and Ukraine, we see
a large difference, with Ukraine receiving more blocks,
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Table 4: Blockpage types for 85,421 Cloudflare-hosted domains from various vantage points.
Blocktypes / Vantage point Ukraine Scotland Pakistan South Africa USA
Status Description (VPN) (VPN) (Home) (Cloud) (Inst.)
No HTTP Response
n/a Timed out 579 542 607 577 540
n/a DNS error 45 112 4096 4 66
n/a Other connection errors 147 959 132 70 525
Geo-blocking totals 313 175 178 103 32
403 Cloudflare: country or region blocked (1009) 257 161 162 88 21
403 SonicWall Geo-IP filter 1 1 0 1 0
403 Other blockpage mentioning geo-blocking 40 11 3 3 0
200 Other blockpage mentioning geo-blocking 15 1 13 11 10
451 Unavailable For Legal Reasons 0 1 0 0 1
Abuse-blocking totals 3431 1417 1874 1537 1255
403 Cloudflare: IP Blocked (1006, 1007, 1008) 23 5 6 5 1
200 Cloudflare: IP Blocked (1006, 1007, 1008) 2 2 2 2 1
503 Cloudflare: Browser Verification 1519 1091 1111 1124 985
200 Cloudflare: Browser Verification 2 2 3 2 3
403 Cloudflare: CAPTCHA Challenge 1874 309 746 395 257
403 OctoNet HTTP filter: VPN / TOR Block 3 0 0 0 0
Misconfigurations totals 8 8 6 9 8
403 Cloudflare: DNS points to invalid IP (1000, 1002) 8 8 6 9 8
Figure 3: Cloudflare’s Browser Challenge in Action
CAPTCHAs, browser verifications. Between the two,
only Ukraine was accused of being a VPN or Tor de-
spite both using the same VPN provider. The VPN/Tor
blockpages came not from Cloudflare, but from OctoNet
HTTP filter.
6 Conclusions
We have laid out a space of blocking that includes, but
also exceeds, what we normally think of as censorship.
We looked at three such forms of blocking in some de-
tail. One of them, country-based blocking, is directly
tied to location. It is more of an approach for implement-
ing blocking than a motivation for blocking, raising the
question of why the blocking is happening. The other
two forms we measured are more like motivations than
implementation approaches. The first, avoiding GDPR
compliance, is, however, directly related to location in
that the websites are blocking visitors from the EU for
being from the EU. The third, security-motivated blocks,
differs in that it does not need to be implemented us-
ing locations. However, we do find large differences in
how common security-based blocks are from one loca-
tion to the next, even when using the same VPN service
to send requests from each location. While we studied
three forms of blocking, they were far from independent
of one another. While each of our studies were small
scale, we hope they stimulate further research on these
issues.
Deciding exactly which of these count as censorship is
politically fraught, and we will not attempt to do so. We
do take the stance that research should cover all forms
of blocking that can adversely affect some users, particu-
larly, when those effects are concentrated on people from
certain countries. Furthermore, we believe the chilling
effects on website availability of even well-intentioned
laws to be an interesting subject of measurement. While
we may wish for a world with both the robust privacy
protections of the GDPR and an Internet free from balka-
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nization, currently, a tradeoff is evident. The blocking of
EU visitors precipitated by a privacy law may even have
an outsized effect on Tor given the outsized number of
Tor exits in the EU. This serves as an example of how the
forms of blocking do not just have interdependencies be-
tween themselves but also with privacy. The presence of
these interdependencies should be kept in mind when at-
tempting to measure censorship to avoid false positives.
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